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The primary intent of this paper is to discuss the efforts
of U.S. Representative Harold Ford, to address certain problems
confronting members of his constituency. These efforts involve
the introduction of legislation as well as dealing with a
federal agency in order to assist the constituents.
These efforts on the part of Congressman Ford are very
significant for several reasons: The intervention on behalf of
the elderly residents represented an attempt to address the needs
of one of the most neglected segments of the American population
—the elderly. The Health Care Legislation introduced by the
Congressman is more comprehensive than what exists at the moment;
and the National Gas Pricing Amendments Act attempted to chal
lenge the dominant role of the oligarchic oil companies in de
termining the price of natural gas.
The main sources of information were Congressional Research
Service Reports, and Inter-office Memoranda from Congressman
Ford’s Washington office. Also a wide variety of secondary in
formation, periodicals and books was used.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congressman Harold E. Ford, a Democrat, from Memphis,
was initially elected to represent the eighth district of Ten
nessee in 1973, when he unseated a three-term incumbent, Dan
Kuykendall, a Republican. The election of Ford, a former state
representative, strongly supported by the black conimunity and a
percentage of liberal-minded, whites within the district, marked
an astounding historical event. Black Memphians, were now con
fident that their needs and demands would be of concern to and
advocated by their Congressional Representative, as opposed to
their needs being overlooked, which may have been the case pre
viously. The City of Memphis was astonished over the defeat of
the, political “giant” Dan Kuykendall, especially by a black per
son.
The recent redistricting of the city, placing more
blacks into the eighth district, and the light turnout of con
servative white voters, confident of Ford’s inability to defeat
Kuykendall in the run-off, contributed significantly to Congress
man Ford’s victory. Therefore, the black, twenty-eight year old
funeral director successfully defeated the incumbent to become
the first black to represent the State of Tennessee in the
United States House of Representatives.
Congressman Ford is presently serving a fourth term
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in office and continues to earn the respect and support of his
constituents. The Congressman now has, along with his district
and Washington offices, in which the writer interned, a branch
office and a mobile office within the district in order to more
effectively assist the constituents by maintaining open lines
of communication between himself and them.
The functions performed in the district office of a Con—
gressman are varied and are always in coordination with those
functions performed in the Washington office. Casework and
legislation are two functions that especially illustrate this
point. The casework function is usually handled in the district
office, and legislation is normally handled in Washington; yet
these functions impact heavily upon one another. Casework is
similar to project work, in that, it concerns organized groups
or individuals compeiEing for money from the federal government
in various forms of disbursements such as grants.1
Nearly every member of Congress performs casework to
some extent, even though it is not fully accepted by many of
them. One advantage of casework is that it is a means of deter
mining the local impact of certain agency operations. Casework
does not need to be initiated. It begins with the receipt of a
letter or phone call or pei~sonal interviews with a constituent
requesting Congressional assistance. The staff person or case
worker assigned to the case then decides which federal agency
1John R. Johannes, t1Congressional Casework: The Bureau
cratic Perspective,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University,
Milwaukee3 Wisconsin, 1978), pp. 2-15.
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has jurisdiction over the situation in question, along with how
the case should be handled, either by phone, letter or in per
son. A case handled by phone is usually done when extensive
agency research is unnecessary to obtain the needed information
the caseworker places a call to the appropriate department or
the agency’s congressional liaison office. If the case is to
be handled by letter, a photostat copy of the constituent’s
letter is made and forwarded to the appropriate agency along.
with either a personally written memo or letter signed by the
Representative. Similarly, a case handled in person in the
member’s district office is subjected to the same procedure as
those requests that emanated from correspondence.
It is quite difficult to calculate the effectiveness
of casework due to the limited amount of empirical data on the
number of cases dealt with by congressional offices.2 The
district office, being closer to the people, acknowledges in
creased personal contact and communication with the constituents,
as well as, allowing staff persons to better understand and
validate constituent complaints or problems For this reason,
casework is usually more effective in the district office.
The district headquarters, which basically has more
space than the Representative’s Washington office, enables
more staff persons to maintain the casework, since the Washing
ton staff must focus on the legislative duties of the
2Mark D. Yacker, “Casework and the Role of a Caseworker
in a Congressional Qff ice,” CRS Report (Washington, D.C.,
October 20, 1977), pp. 2-9.
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congressional office. The legislative function of the congres
sional office entails varying tasks ranging from the House
floor and committee activities to legislative research within
the member’s office concerning issues to be later introduced on
the House floor. Apart from the various legislative duties in
the member’s Washington office, responding to correspondence,
particularly from constituents, is the most time-consuming work.
Although legislative correspondence does not necessarily decide
the way a member will vote, it is still treated carefully and
seriously. The legislative staff must be coordinated and well
prepared in order to ensure that the Representative is adequately
prepared to partake in the numerous legislative forums on Capitol
Hill. The staff’s responsibilities include familiarizing them
selves with the committee report and content of legislation on
the House floor, significant lobbying efforts supporting or
opposing certain bills, awareness of possible amendments fellow
members may be offering along with possible “parliamentary
maneuvers” by other Representatives. The legislative staff per
son should always keep in mind the member’s personality and
political philosophy in researching legislation, drafting bills,
and writing speeches, as well as ensuring that the Representative
is consistent on decisions made regarding a particular issue.
An especially important task of the Washington staff is to ensure
that the member is thoroughly familiar with subjects to be dis
cussed in future committee hearings, including other committee
members’ viewpoints, the pros and cons of each issue and how a
5
• I • 3certain position will afrect the Representative s constituency.
As stated earlier, casework or constituent service, as
it is sometimes referred to, may have a significant impact upon
legislative functions. For example, whether a Member favors or
opposes a certain piece of legislation may largely depend upon
the needs of his constituency. These needs may be determined
through the casework performed in the district office. Once a
constItuent contacts a Member regarding a particular problem,
the Member is instantly made aware of certain needs of his con
stituency. Through casework, the Member is not only able to
personally assist his constituents, earning votes along the way,
but is also familiarized with the various pieces of legislation
affecting his constituents which require his support. There
are, however, problem situations that a Memberts staff cannot
handle through casework, and legislative action may be necessary
to bring forth a change in order to correct the problem. These
~unsolved” casework problems are usually referred to as “Con
gressional oversight.” The term Congressional oversight applies
when constituent problems and inquiries bring to the attention
of legislators situations that require investigation in order to
minimize or correct the problem through some form of legislative
action.
Congressional oversight results from casework correspon
dence that either questions a Member’s position on certain issues
3Marc Yacker, “A Functional Analysis of Office Operations
in the House of Representatives,” CRS Report (Washington, D.C.:
June 2, 1977), pp. 8-20.
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or expresses concern about pertinent legislation affecting them.
When casework correspondence functions as an instrument of Con
gressional oversight, it can be quite useful, as Kenneth Gray
pointed out, it helps in keeping the bureaucracy accountable
and open to all the people, and preserving decentralization of
4power ~n the American Federal System.
Therefore, Congressional oversight may be said to act
as a link between casework and legislation, for the reason that,
it (oversight) binds the two functions in a way that benefits
the constituent by prompting legislative action for constituent
problems or inquiries.
The purpose of this study is to examine the efforts made
by Congressman Ford to assist his constituents in dealing with a
federal agency, as well as introducing pieces of legislation in
order to aid the constituents in addressing some of their con
cerns. In addition, the study also examined the success and
failure of these efforts, and their respective impact upon the
constituency.
4Kenneth E. Gray, ~Congressional Interferences in Adminis
tration,”~ed, Daniel Blazen.
(New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 542.
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
The Background of the Agency
The offices of Congressman Harold Ford have only been
in existence since January 1974, after being elected to repre
sent the Eighth Congressional District of Tennessee. The
Washington office is composed of an administrative assistant,
press secretary, several legislative assistants and clerical
workers whose main function is to undertake legislative research
in order to update the Congressman on significant issues af
fecting his constituency, and to sometimes recommend how the
Congressman should react to the proposed legislation of a col
league requesting his support. The district office is struc
tured similar to the Washington office, in that it employs an
office manager, several caseworkers or constituent assistants,
and a clerical worker, all of whom focus their attention toward
directly assisting constituents, and keeping the Congressman
informed of the needs and demands of the constituency. The
branch and mobile offices are each manned by a single consti
tuent assistant, and are situated within the community in order
to maintain open lines of communication between the Congressman
and his constituency, and to assure the constituents of his




The writer served as an intern in the office of U.S.
Representative Harold Ford of Memphis, Tennessee from June
1980 until August of the same year. The writer worked in the
Washington office and later in the district office in Memphis.
Legislative tasks were assigned in Washington, and casework
functions in Memphis. Legislative tasks that were performed
included researching of House legislation in order to respond
to constituent demands, always bearing in mind the particular
views of the Congressman and how those views will affect his
constituents. Casework duties involved assisting the Congress
man’s constituents in their dealing with federal agencies, and
with problems of various natures ranging from interpreting
acts of Congress, to assisting low-income individuals in deal
ing with the high costs of utilities.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Casework, in most instances, is handled somewhat rou
tinely within the district office. The procedure simply in
volves screening of the constituent correspondence for validity
and then assigning the matter to a caseworker. However, there
are cases that are exceptions, and require much more attention
than that of~a caseworker, especially when a considerable nuni
ber of constituents complain about the same problem. When this
happens, the situation is brought to the attention of the Con
gressman to be further investigated by the legislative staff in
Washington, who make recommendations to him with respect to the
steps that should be taken to resolve the problem. Problems of
this nature confronted staff persons in the district office of
Congressman Ford during the writer’s internship. The major ones
being the rent increase for senior citizens, the escalating
price of natural gas across the nation, and the need for Medi
care coverage of certain chronically ill elderly persons.
The main problems that confronted Representative Ford
in addressing the needs of his constituency were lack of legis
lative support from his colleagues as well as bureaucratic
intransigence in adhering strictly to the letter of the law.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
The case study approach was utilized in the analysis
of Congressman Ford’s efforts to assist members of his con
stituency. This method allows the writer to examine and ana
lyze the problem, and develop alternate courses of action or
recommendations that may be used by the Congressman in future
attempts to assist members of his constituency.
The writer used primary and secondary data collection
techniques to gather relevant data for this study. Primary
data collection techniques included participant observation
and interviews. The participant observation technique fur
nished first-hand data on the daily work patterns of the Mem
phis and Washington offices, along with the Congressman’s
methods of handling casework in the district office and legis
lation in the Washington office.
Interviews were utilized to ascertain the attitudes of
the constituents toward Congressman Ford concerning his efforts
to assist them, Questions regarding how the constituents per
ceived the effectiveness of the Congressman’s attempts to re
solve constituent problems were posed by the writer. A total
of forty constituents were questioned in regard to their satis
faction with Congressman Ford’s performance as their Congres
sional representative, as far as meeting their needs. Special
10
11
emphasis was placed on their views of the Congressman’s con
cerns of the resolution of their problems. An extensive inter
view was not conducted, and questions asked were done in a
subtle manner, due to the fact that certain limitations were
placed upon Congressional employees, particularly during the
Congressman’s election campaign. The sample interviewed repre
sented a small segment of the Congressman’s district of approxi
mately 500,000 people, which is composed of the inner-city
area of Memphis, exlcuding the wealthier suburbs and the county.
The predominantly black district is made up of lower to middle
class blacks as well as lower to middle class whites, However,
the sample of persons questioned represents a cross section of
that segment of the district which calls more upon Congressman
Fard to solicit his help in resolution of their problems, lower
tomoderate income blacks. Forty of the 300 constituents assisted
by caseworkers during the internship were selected on the basis
of assistance requested of the Congressman. The interviewees were
subtly asked five open-ended questions regarding their expecta
tions of their Congressional representative, and the extent to
which those expectations had been fulfilled. Only those consti
tuents contacting the Congressman’s district office with prob
lems concerning the lack of adequate housing, or the inability
to pay unaffordable utility bills were chosen for the interview:
Three of the Congressman’s six Memphis staff members
were also interviewed regarding their perceptions of the confi
dence and support the Congressman enjoyed from his constituency.
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Questions posed to constituents and staff are in Appendices
A and B. The secondary data were gathered from a variety of
sources; numerous newspaper and journal articles such as the
‘~Ford Report,” “CRS Reports,” and “Newsweek” were used for the
purpose of providing the writer with information concerning
casework, and legislative activities in the Congressional office.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
A large number of Congressmen generally attempt to ac
commodate the needs of their Congressional districts to some
extent. There are certain problems, however, that for various
reasons, cannot be resolved by a single Member, but require
the cooperation of federal departments and support of fellow
colleagues in the House.
The first example of this involved the rate increase in
rent charged to senior citizens in two privately run high-rise
apartments within the Congressmants district in Memphis. After
being contacted by a number of constituents in regard to the
problem, Congressman Ford assigned the case to a member of his
Washington staff to be further investigated, and to be brought
to the attention of the federal government. The problem en
tails the increase in monthly rent rates of the high-rises by
27 percent. The residents of these high-rises include low to
moderate income senior citizens, who will be unable to afford
the sudden increase in rent payments. At the moment the resi
dents are eligible to only receive federal assistance under
Section 236.~ Under Section 236, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD):
5Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Public Law




• .. allows for interest subdisies to be paid to the
renter to enable eligible families ‘to live in housing
that would otherwise consume more than 25 percent of
their income.
Since the residents of the Memphis high-rises are presently
classified to receive federal assitance only under Section 236,
the rent increases would impact greatly upon the limited incomes
of the elderly residents.
Upon the initial opening of the high-rises for occupancy,
the residents were in the low and moderate income brackets. How
ever, due to inflation and other economic factors, the residents
are now basically in the low and poverty level brackets. These
people, therefore, are qualified for Section 8 housing,7 which
would subsidize most of the family or individual’s monthly rent,
according to whatever the person could afford to pay for rent,
by funneling “assistance to the builder or landlord, not di
rectly to the household.”8 Attempts to assist the residents of
the high-rises by the Congressman’s office have included con
tacting the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to explore
the possibility of obtaining Section 8 eligibility assistance
for the residents and contacting the Memphis Housing Authority
to seek alternate housing for these senior citizens if Section
8 associated funds are not obtained for the high-rises.
6Harold E. Ford,”Inter-office Memorandd’ (Washington,
D.C.: 1979).
7Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Public
Law 93-383, United States Statutes at Large, 93rd Congress, 2nd
Session, Vol. 88, Part 1, p. 653 (1974).
8Harold E. Ford, “Inter-Office Memoranda” (Washington,
D.C., 1979).
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The Congressman’s intervention on behalf of the elderly
residents in the high-rise apartments proved unsuccessful be
cause of the strict adherence by HUD officials to bureaucratic
rules and regulations. According to the officials of HUD,
since the residents are currently under the Section 236 program
they cannot be transferred to another government program.
The officials of HUD are quite aware of the severe im
pact that increases in the rent will have upon the residents of
the apartments, since the tenants’ sources of income are limited.
However, because of the rigidity of bureaucratic rules and regu
lations, they were not able to respond to the genuine need of
the elderly residents. According to Robert Merton:
An effective bureaucracy demands reliability of response
and strict devotion to regulations.9
He further maintains that this is a source of the structural
overconformity on the part of bureaucracy because:
a) Such devotion to the rules leads to their
transformation into absolutes; they are no
longer concieved as relative to a given
set of purposes;
b) This interferes with ready adaptation under
special conditions not clearly envisaged
by those who drew up the general rules;
c) Thus, the very elements which conduce toward
efficiency in general produce inefficiency
in special instances.
The lack of flexibility on the part of bureaucratic
officials to examine the particular circumstances of cases has
9Robert Merton, “A Structural Bureaucracy,” in Reader
~ eds. B. Hockey; A. Gray; H. Selvin (New York:
Free Press, 1952), p. 366.
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done more harm to the clientele they are supposed to serve.
Several instances can be cited that have had disastrous conse
quences simply by strict application of bureaucratic rules.
The very impersonal nature of the bureaucratic structure has
contributed towards the HUD officials indifference to respond
to the needs of the elderly residents in the high-rise complexes
in Memphis.
Naturally, a sharp increase in rental fees of the senior
citizen high-rises would have drastic financial impact upon the
residents, forcing many of them to locate alternative housing.
Those who would have to seek other housing would be confronted
with several barriers and problems in locating adequate housing,
particularly the elderly residents who are also black. In the
United States, numerous barriers exist in seeking adequate hous
ing for senior citizens, especially for black senior citizens.
Barriers that prevent aged blacks from easily finding satisfac
tory housing include racial, political and economic problems.
It is inherent in these barriers that racial factors work at
placing black senior citizens at a disadvantage in the housing
market. 10
The barriers of racism is at the center of the problems
facing black Americans in attempting to exercise their rights
and freedom, and is intricately interwoven into the fabrica
tion of other obstacles which may be~extricated for examination.
10Roosevelt Johnson, Ph.D. TtBarriers to Adequate
Housing for Elderly Blacks,t’ Aging, vol. 279 (April 1978),
pp. 33-39.
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Moreover, elderly blacks are not only victims of institutiona
lized racism, they are also hampered by various other discrimi
nation that accompany age, poverty, and functional illiteracy.
Two forms of racial prejudice which affect housing
conditions for older black Americans are individualized and
institutionalized racism. Individualized racism is practiced
by white individuals who attempt to maintain blacks in an in
ferior status, simply for the reason that the individual is
black. Tactics of humiliation employed by whites to prevent
blacks from buying homes in certain areas would be an example
of individual racism.
Although slavery, the origin of institutionalized
racism in this country toward blacks, ended over a century
ago, as a legally sanctioned institution, the prevalence of
stereotypes, prejudices and several other forms of discrimina
tion continue. “Jim Crow” laws which were diligently enforced
in the Southern states,and often discovered in Northern states,
from 1899 until 1954, influenced the institutionalized racism
in practice today. A nation that has housing policies that
tend to find a large majority of blacks living in dilapidated
substandard housing, represents institutionalized racism.11
In the United States, housing legislation, policy,
guidelines and funding requirements, and the actual implementa
tion of these housing practices work to bar adequate housing
from aged blacks. According to W. C. Baer, for over a quarter
lllbid
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of a century, the federal government has shown concern for the
housing problems of the aged. One of the initial pieces of
housing legislation, the Housing Act of 1949, stated that there
“should be a decent house and suitable environment for every
American.”12 However, the well-known 1954 Supreme Court deci
~still
being decided upon, and therefore the housing legislation of
1949 had little impact upon blacks.
Apart from the Housing Act of 1949, Sections 236 and 8
and other developments relative to housing programs to aid the
elderly are:
1. Public Housing: housing which is publicly
owned and usually administered by public
housing authorities.
2. Rent Supplement Program: a payment by the
federal government to make up the difference
between 25 percent of their income, and the
cost of the housing.
3. Rental Projects:
Section 207: multi-family rental housing
which consisted of the bulk of the multi
family housing insured by the FHA.
Section 231: senior citizen housing, a
special mortgage insurance program for the
elderly and the handicapped. It was
abandoned in 1970 because of the relatively
high failure rate.
Section 202: provides loans for senior
citizen housing made directly by the federal
government (rather than insuring privately
C, Baer, ~‘Federal Housing Programs for the Eider~y,”
in In-Community Planning for an Aging Society, eds, Lawton and
Byerts (Stroudsburg, PA: Downs and Hutchinson, 1978),. pp. 30-36.
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made loans as was done for Section 23l).13
Although the federal government provides several types
of housing programs for the aged, it is doubtful as to whether
these programs effectively meet the needs of black senior citi
zens. Despite the abundant rhetoric produced by the legisla
tive committees, the housing needs of American senior citizens
are far from being met. Furthermore, until the 1970s, little
focus was given to the housing problems of elderly blacks. The
National Caucus on the Black Aged (NCBA) was founded in 1970 to
assist in redirecting the attention of the federal government
to servicing the needs of black senior citizens in regard to
housing and other matters by participating and cooperating with
the 1971 White House Conference on the Aging. Prior to this con
ference, very few studies on the housing needs of the elderly
14and elderly blacks existed.
Inflation, which has become a national disease, places
additional burdens on the senior citizens’ already overtaxed
income, by depressing their economic status further below the
minimum subsistence level. Poverty tends to increase the phy
sical problems facing senior citizens by forcing sacrifices in
physical comfort, and nutrition. These problems become exacer
bated by cutbacks in critical areas such as housing and health
care, as inflation tends to restrict their purchasing power.
13Roosevelt Johnson, “Barriers to Adequate Housing for
Elderly Blacks,” ~ Vol. 279 (l978):33-39.
l4lbid
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Apart from the fixed income levels provided by Social Security
and similar forms, these senior citizens rely either on private
savings or pensions accrued during the employed portion of their
lives. These income sources have become drastically cut, in
spite of the “double digit inflation rates” that have forced
many retirees to cope with detrimental changes in the precluded
lifestyle of their retirement years.15
As of 1977, Americans aged sixty-five years and older
amassed to nearly 23.5 million, which amounts to 10.9 percent
of the population. The elderly, however, account for 13 percent
of the 25 million U.S. citizens whose incomes fall below the
official poverty line. An overwhelmingly large majority of
elderly Americans must depend upon some form of in-kind trans
fers of services such as food stamps, Medicare, and subsidized
housing. For a number of older Americans, these sources of in
come provide insufficient levels of income.16 In an article
highlighting peculiar pecuniary problems of the elderly, Edward
Deak and Walter Smith stated that:
As of 1976, half of the over age 65 families had
incomes below $8,721 with one in seven having an
income below the poverty line of $3,417 for
couples and $2,720 for individuals.
In contrast, Autumn 1977 Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) budget estimates for a retired couple living
at an intermediate budget standard show ~ need for
an average $7,198 in income nationwide,17
15Ibid.
16Ibid
17Edward J. Deak and Walter Smith “Inflation and the
Elderly,” ~g~g (September-October l979):3-6.
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The housing situation for the elderly in the United
States desperately needs significant efforts to improve it,
and there is little evidence to suggest that prolonged efforts
are underway to meet the needs of the aged.
~th C are Le is lat ion
An illustration of a bill sponsored by a Congressman in
an attempt to be of assistance to his constituency, is ttle health
care legislation concerning the elderly that Congressman Ford
introduced in reaction to demands made by the elderly consti
tuents within his district regarding the financial burdens of
health care in the United States. The bill attempted to amend
the Social Security Act, so that dental care, eyeglasses and
hearing aids will be included in Medicare coverage.
In attempting to assist the constituents, Congressmen
frequently introduce or avidly support legislation that will
significantly benefit their constituencies. For example, Con
gressman Ford sponsored the Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act
of 1979, in response to the demands from his Congressional Dis
trict. The introduction of a bill, however, does not guarantee
that it will reach the House floor, or even the committee floor,
for debate. Each bill introduced in the House of Representatives
goes through several steps prior to reaching the House floor,
if in fact, it does.
Congressman Ford tried to enlist support for the health
care legislation by pushing for public hearings while the bill
was in committee; and through press releases to major newspapers
22
in order to gain support from the American public, by informing
them of the necessity of the bill’s passage. Congressman Ford’s
chances of the legislation becoming law were enhanced by the
fact that one of the committees to which the legislation was
referred was the Ways and Means Committee, on which the Congress
man sits, along with the fact that Congressman Ford also sat on
the Select Committee on Aging, chaired by Representative Claude
Pepper (D.-Fla.), who avidly supported the legislation. Con
gressman Ford hoped that the increased pressure on the United
States for a National Health Insurance program would “bring
some results.” However, he was doubtful that Congress would move
toward increasing medical coverage under Medicare that year (1979),
and rightfully so, in that his bill was killed in committee.
Congressman Ford’s health care legislation, which was introduced
with the intention of expanding Medicare coverage to include
certain chronic illnesses suffered by the elderly, died in both
the Committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Ways and
Means. Congressman Harley Staggers, Chairman of the Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee would not allow public hearings
or even committee discussion of the Health Care Legislation. This
stand was taken by him due to the opposition of conservative
minded commiteee members who maintained that the bill was much
too costly to be seriously considered. This view was also ac
cepted by Al Ullman, then Chairman of the Ways ~nd Means Committee,
who agreed that the bill called for an extensive expansion of the
Medicare program and would prove to be too expensive.
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Although the official reason given for the Congress
man’s bill being killed in committee was the cost factor in
volved, based upon the forces that opposed Senator Kennedy’s
Comprehensive Health Program, it is quite possible to assume
that the same forces exerted pressures on the Congressmen
that resulted in the demise of the Ford bill. This assumption
is made on the basis that Congressman Ford’s legislation called
for the expansion of medicinal care services which was also the
focal point of Senator Kennedy’s bill. Therefore, strong op
posing forces to Kennedy’s legislation, such as the American
Medical Association and the American Hospital Association which
have vigorously opposed any national health bill as an attempt
to introduce socialism into the United States through the back
door, utilized the same argument against the Ford bill.
The attempt made by Congressman Ford did stir some con
troversy over the issue of health care, and dental coverage in
particular, not being provided by Medicare. In three newspaper
commentaries, it was cited that nearly two thirds of the people
over sixty-five had lost all of their upper or lower teeth,
making them more susceptible to “poor nutrition, speech difficul
ties, slower healing of oral wounds, greater risks of infection,
(and) psychological problems. In addition, the articles acknow
ledged the efforts of Congressman Ford in attempting to alle
viate this problem for the nation’s elderly through legislative
action. It is significant to note that, Medicare covered
74 percent of hospital bills for persons sixty-five and older
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in 1977, and two-thirds of the $41.3 billion in health care
costs for elderly persons which were paid by Medicare did not
cover any dental work. This is due to the fact that the need
to include dental care under Medicare coverage in the Social
Security law was looked over by Congress during the mid-sixties.18
In a survey done several years ago, only one-fifth of
older Americans with yearly incomes totaling $5,000 or less
visit a dentist even once a year. Many senior citizens simply
cannot afford to invest a portion of their already overtaxed in
come into dental care. For those senior citizens who paid their
own dental bills in 1977, their expenses grossed about $1 bil
lion. Approximately one person in ten aged sixty-five or older
needs dentures, but does not have them. Nearly a third of the
older Aemricans who do own dentures need to have them either
19refitted or replaced.
The situation is similar for elderly persons with visual
difficulties, in that Medicare will only cover the costs for
eyeglasses needed after cataract surgery. To further exacerbate
the problem, private insurance companies rarely cover visual
care. In a floor speech to the Members of the House in order to
gain advocacy for his legislation, Congressman Fotd stated that:
“the chronic vision deficiencies are the most prevalent of ail
ments among the nation’s aged,” second only to arthritis. He
18William Steif, “Rep Tord Pushes for Dental Bill,”




continued to emphasize the need for better visual care for
senior citizens since many aged persons are “mistakenly and
cruelly thought to be senile when in fact they are unable to
see the necessary visual stimuli.”20
A third crucial health problem suffered by the nation’s
elderly and included in Congressman Ford’s legislation is hear
ing impairment. It was concluded by the American Speech and
Hearing Association that the Federal Council on Aging that at
least one-half of elderly Americans suffer a hearing problem,
for which the answer in many instances, may require a hearing
device. According to a report from the General Accounting
Office, the average cost of a hearing aid would fall into the
range of $350. It is unfortunate that many elderly Americans
afflicted by hearing difficulties are financially unable to
afford the needed hearing equipment, in that contributions these
people may have to offer society are inhibited by their handicap.
The hearing device would also eliminate much of the isolation
and desparity that often results from their inability to com
21municate.
Medicare provides no coverage for “hearing examinations
or aids,” and only 20 percent of the states provide audio
coverage under Medicaid, the other states offer no coverage.
In addition to this, private insurance policies “rarely provide
20Harold E. Ford, Floor Speech to the House of Represen
tatives, Inter-office_Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: 1979),
21Ibid
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coverage for hearing aid expenses.”22
Congressman Ford is not the first to introduce legis
lation on the increased demand of affordable health services
for the elderly. One example would be the legislation of com
munity social and health organizations, first introduced in
1974 by Senators Kennedy and Corman. The idea was to “develop
community social and health organizations under one auspice”
that would attempt to “integrate service.” It was proposed to
have Medicare provide the social and health services, as was
attempted by Congressman Ford’s legislation, but going a step
farther to propose that:
Local personal care organizations be developed and
funded through non-profit corporations that would
purchase care for all beneficiaries within a sub-
state area.23
The fate of this legislation, and future legislation such as
Congressman Ford’s, must depend upon the passage of the National
Health Insurance Program - a program that the middle income
Americans have not attempted to support. Although Senator Ken
nedy’s proposal would cost the taxpayer less than he presently
pays for routine medical expenses, while insuring better medi
cal care, and “pose no greater threat to privacy,” there is
much resistance to it. A~cording to the late George Meany, this
resistance is due to the fact that:
22Edward J. Deak and Walter J. Smith, “Inflation and
the Elderly,” ~ (September-October l979):3-6.
23Toby Cohen, “The Battle of Health Care,” Nation
(November 10, l979):455-458.
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the medical establishment has managed through its
$200 billion lobbying campaign to convince the taxpayer
that passage of all-inclusive national health insurance
will result in costs going through the ceiling and 24
crowds of impatient patients in every doctor’s office.
Another reason for this resistance may be due to the
indication of polls, according to Senator Russell Long, that
The overwhelming majority of the American people are
not concerned about being insured against run-of-the
mill hospital bills. What . .. is a matter of very
serious concern to them is ... catastrophic medical
bills that wipe out all their savings . . . .25
Congressmen who usually defend the interest of the
American Medical Association bitterly opposed the Kennedy bill
during debate. The American Hosptial Association also engaged
in strenuous lobbying activities to influence legislators into
supporting their stance against hospital and medical cost con
trol. Kennedy’s Health Care Program would not only place medi
cal care on a national budget (similar to the defense budget)
providing for the budget to be expanded “only in proportion
with the national economy,” but would also monitor physicians
and hospitals each month to ensure that they do not exceed
their allocations. Doctors would be paid from these budgets
under fee schedules negotiated by the physicians, hospitals,
insurance companies, employers, labor-union leaders, government
representatives and consumers. Hospitals would be paid in ac
cordánce with the annually negotiated sub-budgets. Premiums
24Ibid




paid to the insurance companies by consumers, employers and
the government would be utilized to pay the physicians and
hospitals, Under current regulations the insurance companies
and the government are allowed to treat hospitals:
like the doting parent who tells the son (as)
he’s packing off to college: Let me know your
expenses at the end of the year and I’ll pay you
back.
Senator Kennedy’s Health Plan would, in contrast, say to the
hospital, “here’s a $2 million and that’s all you get for the
whole year.”26
Furthermore, the medical profession has misled a large
segment of the population to believe that “providing free care
or medical insurance to the elderly and the indigent has sent
medical costs soaring.”27 It is this belief that has discou
raged middle class Americans from supporting social health
care or the expanding of present health care programs, such as
the proposed expansion of Medicare coverage in Congressman
Ford’s Health Care Legislation.
Although Senator Kennedy’s National Health Care Pro
gram did gain strong support from influential groups such as
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
the National Council of Senior Citizens, and the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations,




Prcgram to insure quality health care, and to control hospital
and medical costs for all Americans; yet, the interests of the
dominant and well organized groups such as the’.AMA, prevailed.
Interest groups such as these also agreed that “cost reimburse
ment is basically responsible for the escalation of medical and
hospital costs. A.~ discussed previously, cost reimbursement en
abl~s hospitals to be paid retrospectively, with hardly any
limit placed on the amount of money allowed to be spent annually.
Kennedy’s legislation was designed to provide medical
care coverage for every U.S. citizen, through indirect payment
by the government to physicians. No one would be refused medi
cal services, regardless of minuteness or seriousness of the
ailment. The plan wouLd cost the taxpayer considerably less
than he presently spends for health costs (due to deductibles
and co-insurance). In addition, not only would hospitals and
physicians be monitored, but the insurance companies employed
by the government as budget monitors and fiscal intermediaries
would also be monitored.28
Presently, Congressman Ford. has reintroduced the health
care legislation in the 97th Congress, and has again begun cam
paigning to obtain Congressional support for the bill.
The Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act of 1979
A second example of a bill sponsored by Representative
Ford in an attempt to assist his district is the Natural Gas
30
Pricing Amendments Act of 1979. Hundreds of Memphians had
begun forming into groups in order to organize methods of pro
test against consistently increasing utility bills passed on
to them by the Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division. One of
the methods of protest utilized by the consumers was attracting
local and national attention regarding the problem of high
utility rates, by alerting local officials and their Congres
sional Representative, Harold Ford.
The Ford bill was introduced in an attempt to reduce
ceiling prices on several classes of natural gas which had pre
viously been deregulated as a result of the 1978 Natural Gas
Policy Act. Although deregulation has increased the supply of
natural gas, creating a surplus, prices have sharply risen
simultaneously. This contradicts the laws of supply and de
mand.29 Therefore, the Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act of
1979 was drafted to check this inequity. The bill, however, was
killed in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Subcommittee on Energy and Power during the firt session of the
96th Congress. The intent of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 was to allow natural gas prices to slowly rise to world
market levels, in an effort by Congress to encourage oil pro
ducers to discover more gas. This was attempted by the lifting
of ceiling prices on several classes of natural gas, and
finally decontrol of gas completely in 1985. The plan backfired,
29Harold E. Ford The Ford Report (Washington,D.C.:
1979)
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however, and American consumers were the victims, During the
early part of 1979, two months after the bill went into effect,
the number of wells drilled increased by 7 percent, as compared
with the same period the year before.3°
Government and industry experts predicted natural gas
increases of 18 percent to 25 percent in Memphis, Chicago, New
York and other cities, in 1979, the year Congressman Ford drafted
the Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act. The U.S. Department of
Energy expected the higher gas prices to cost American consumers
$1.7 billion to $2 billion in 1979.31
The enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 fol
lowed one of the most lengthy and bitter debates in the history
of the U.S. Congress. The final compromise incorporated into the
legislation was hardly satisfactory to gas producers or to resi
dential users, but nearly everyone affected by the legislation
felt the bill to be the only solution to the problem Congress
man Harley Staggers, Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Com
merce Committee was therefore reluctant to reopen discussion on
the controversial issue of natural gas deregulation. Congress
man Ford’s legislation was not discussed in committee, due to
the intent of the bill to reopen debate on the energy issue, so
recently, after the issue had been compromised in the Natural Gas
Policy Act.
30Harold E. Ford, Inter-Office Memorandum (Washington,
D~C. 1979).
31”Natural Gas Up,” ~~g~4ne (March 19, 1979),
p. 74.
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In addition, the Carter Administration advocated the
deregulation of oil and natural gas prices. Carter’s National
Energy Plan package contained the controversial Natural Gas
Policy Act, which called for phased deregulation. Just like
the Congressman’s Health Care Legislation, the official reason
given for the demise of his bill in committee is incredible.
Chairman Staggers’ refusal to reopen discussion on the deregula
tion of natural gas was due to the preponderant influence and
pressure exerted on the Congressmen by the unholy alliance of
gas producers, such as Exxon and interstate pipelines companies
and distribution companies such as Tenneco, whose best interests
are served by maintaining the status quo. These companies are
robbing the consumer by charging exorbitant prices for oil and
gas in spite of the overabundance of the supply of these commo
dities. This really makes mockery of the economic principle
of supply and demand.
The escalation of natural gas prices due to “phased
deregulation” has negatively affected Congressman Ford’s con
stituents. As the Congressman stated,
Something is mighty ... wrong when ... a Memphis family,
which takes home only $500 per month pays $200 to heat
a five-room home. And, something must be done when
government asks workers to keep their pay within seven
percent of last year’s, although they are told by the
same government that na~ural gas prices will rise a
minimum of 14 percent.3
Senator Jim Sasser, a Democrat from Tennessee, agreed
32Harold E. Ford, Inter-Office Memorandun~ (Washington,
D.C.: 1979).
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with Congressman Ford in thinking that the rise in gas prices
would worsen. The Senator assumed that relaxing the price ceil
ings on gas may cost U.S. consumers more than $5 billion.
Senator Sasser, who chaired the Subcommittee on Intergovern
mental Relations, which “looked into” the “economics of the gas
industry,” stated that, “The ceiling prices are becoming floor
prices.” The expectation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)
was that:
Residential users would be cushioned from steep price
increases, because large industrial users would be
charged a price equivalent to that of oil for any
‘new’ gas they buy - so-called incremental pricing.
However, contrary to the assumptions of the Natural
Gas Policy Act that oil prices would increase gradually, they
doubled; therefore, as far as gas producers were concerned,
residential and commercial consumers would obtain gas much too
cheaply. As a result, the gas producers launched a strong cam
paign to repeal the legislation. A conglomerate of industrial
gas consumers, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers, attempted to influence
legislators to rescind Phase II of incremental pricing that would
negatively impact upon the gas industry by regulating about “3
trillion cubic feet a year of gas - more than a third of current
industrial consumption,”34 The resciasion of Phases I and II
would extend the encumbrance of exorbitant gas prices over to
33”The Clamor for Decontrol of Natural Gas,” Business
Week (May 19, l980):l44, 146.
34Ibid.
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all consumers. Basically, natural gas producer and interstate
distribution and pipeline companies were only interested in
either increasing the price of gas to equal the price of oil or
in immediately decontrolling gas altogether~35 Gas producers,
such as Atlantic Richfield, and interstate pipelines companies
and distribution companies such as Tenneco, feared that the in
troduction and passage of legislations threatened the regula
tion of oil and natural gas prices.
In addition, a gap existed between the oil and natural
gas prices charged to residential and commercial users who were
exempt from incremental prices. Industrial consumers and gas
producers feared that as long as gas remained “cheap” for
residential and commercial consumers, gas prices would become
more difficult to deregulate.
Predictably, consumer and interest groups supporting the
regulation of natural gas prices fervently argued against the
NGPA’s intention of completely decontrolling gas prices. Strong
labor coalitions opposed decontrolling oil and natural gas
prices due to their conviction that deregulation would allow
higher gas prices to be charged to consumers. Unions in the
coalition included the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal workers, the United Auto Workers, and the United Steel
workers. Other organizations fervently opposing the NGPA were
numerous senior citizen, consumer and public interest groups.
For instance, Douglas Fraser, president of UAW and the late
35Ibid,
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George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO wrote letters to Congress
men opposing the legislation, for the reason that its passage
would prove too costly for American consumers. William P.
Winpisinger, president of the International Association of
Machinists referred to the Energy Plan as tIthe worst scandal on
the American energy scene since the Teapot Dome Scandal of
1920. ,,36
In 1979, two percent of gas used by consumers continued
to be bound under the long-term contract at 75 cents per thou
sand cubic feet. Many of the contracts were close to expiration.
Therefore, gas received by consumers at the new prices ranging
from $1.99 to $2.26 per thousand cubic feet, indicates that
American consumers would gradually be hit by the drastic in-
37creases.
In an attempt to remedy some of the problems caused by
the Natural Gas Policy Act, Congressman Ford introduced his
Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act. The Congressman vigorously
attempted togain support for his bill by encouraging fellow
colleagues to join him in sponsoring the bill in order to gain
assistance in obtaining support forthe passage of the bill, and,
by requesting that interested lobbyists inform House members of
the relevance of the legislation upon the American consumer.
In a press release issued by Congressman Ford, in an
36Richard Halloran, “Bill to End Natural Gas Price Curbs,
Key Part of Energy Plan, in New Peril,” New York Times, August 4,
1978, pp. D2, D7.
37”~Tatural Gas Up,” ~~M~g~zine (March 19, 1979):74.
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effort to arouse advocates for the Natural Gas Pricing Amend
ments Act, he remarked that:
Something is .. wrong when gas producers received
about $60 billion in total revenues between 1970
and 1978; yet, for the next eight years - for sub
staintially less gas - total revenue will probably
exceed $254.2 billion as a result of (.the 1978)
Natural Gas Policy Act.38
In addition, the Congressman stated in a House floor
speech in another effort to foster endorsement of his bill that:
I ask you how we can justify the increasing costs of
natural gas, especially since, for the first time in
recent history, natural gas is in a surplus? In an
American system founded on justice, is it not a vio
lation of the natural laws of supply and demand to
allow this situation to continue? And, most impor
tantly, in an American system founded on justice, I
speak with neither reservation nor hesitation in ap
pealing to your sense of fairness to rectify these
inequities
38Harold E. Ford, Inter-Office Memoranda (Washington,
DCC.: 1979).
39Ibid.
VI. A SU~4ARY OF INTERVIEWS WITH THE CONSTITUENTS
In the light of the failure of the Congressman’s effort to win
passage of his bills and to intervene with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to address the needs of his con
stituents, the writer conducted these interviews in order to
ascertain the constituents’ attitudes and perceptions of their
Representative. These interviews revealed that the constituents
agreed that Congressman Ford is interested in assisting them.
Consequently, they are very pleased with his performance as
their Representative. Although many of the low income consti
tuents were not familiar with Congressman Ford’s attempts to
introduce legislations impacting upon their problems, yet those
interviewed were confident of the Congressman’s ability to
“take good care of them” in Washington; as such, they were only
interested in the Congressman’s ability to resolve their ~wn
individual problems. Likewise, the writer observed that the
middle class constituents also expressed eavorable opinions
about their Representative. However, they mainly were concerned
about his voting pattern or position on national issues such
as busing or prayer in the schools.
Constituents responded to questions one and four con
cerning the Congressman’s effectiveness in resolving their
problems quite positively. All of the interviewees strongly
37
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agreed that since Congressman Ford entered office a definite
change had taken place within their district, Of the forty
persons interviewed, all strongly agreed that the Congressman
had offered hope in resolving problems that they felt would
otherwise be overlooked by other local or national officials.
In response to question two, the respondents disagreed with the
assumption that their problem(s) could not have been resolved
without the assistance of the Congressman. It may be noted
that in question five, twenty-five of the persons interviewed
had not made any attempt to assist themselves prior to con
tacting the Congressman. Of those remaining, ten had made a
single effort to assist themselves, and five had made several
efforts (two or more) to assist themselves. All the consti
tuents interviewed, however, appeared to be totally dependent
upon the Congressman’s assistance to remedy their problem. As
indicated in question three, nine of the interviewees were so
dependent upon the Congressman for assistance that none would
allow a caseworker to assist them, but insiéted upon talking
directly with the Congressman to insure that their problem would
be resolved. The remaining thirty-one had no objections to the
Congressman’s staff assisting them, whether he (Congressman Ford)
was in town or not.
Among those staff persons interviewed, (three of the
six caseworkers in the district office) , all felt that the
Congressman was greatly supported by his constituency, even
though every case accepted by them had not been resolved. It
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was also noted by the staff persons that some constituents are
quite dependent upon the Congressman to resolve certain problems,
and their support for him may stem from that dependency, How
ever, since most of his constituents do not depend upon him for
casework assistance, district support for the Congressman was
not threatened. This is due perhaps to the “deep roots” and
trust established by him within the district.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
One of the major problems encountered by Congressman
Ford was the lack of support from legislative colleagues in
attempting to pass certain legislation, specifically his Health
Care Legislation, and Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act of 1979.
This problemfaced by Congressman Ford, is not peculiar because
it has been faced by many Congressmen throughout the history of
the U.S. Congress. However, this is due to the nature of access
to the corridors of power in the U.S. and the hegemonic position
enjoyed by very powerful and well organized interest groups.
Therefore, legislations that may seem logical, such as Congress
man Ford’a Natural Gas Pricing Amendments Act, may not become
law, due to stronger coalitions opposing the legislation.
The following are recommendations and observations that
may enhance the possibility of Congressman Ford successfully
passing leglislation, such as the Natural Gas Pricing Amend
ments Act, or his Health Care Legislation, in order to better
meet the needs of his constituency:
1, The bureaucratic rules should become more flexible
in order to take into consideration the peculiar circumstances
of cases.
2. Interests groups such as the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the American Federation
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of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations should educate
the American consumer of the advantages of the Comprehensive
Health Program; and to point out the fallacy of the propoganda
put out by interest groups such as, the American Medical Associa
tion and the American Hospital Association.
3. The American taxpayers should organize themselves
into well structured interest groups in order to vote out the
Congressmen who are opposed to the passage of a Comprehensive
Health Bill in the United States during the next elections.
4. The Federal Government should nationalize all gas
and oil companies in America. This is the only way the consumers
can expect any fair deal. The private companies currently con
trolling this market are simply interested in making more profit.
General Instructions: Please respond to the following state
ments concerning Congressman Ford by stating whether you
strongly agree (SA); agree (A); disagree (D); strongly disagree
(SD); or don’t know (DK). If you wish to make any further
comments, please do so
Interview_Schedule
1. Since Congressman Ford has been
your Congressional Representa
tive significant political and
social changes have taken place
in the district. (In other words,
the needs of the constituency
are now being met.)
2. The problem for which you are
requesting assistance may have.
been resolved by yourself with
out the Congressman’s assistance.
3. The Congressman’s staff should
assist you while he is away in
Washington
4. The Congressman’s efforts to
assist you have significantly
aided in the resolution of your
problem
5. Other avenues should be explored
by you to resolve your problem
before contacting the Congress
man







General Instructions: Please respond to the following
statetments by indicating whether you strongly agree (SA);
Agree (A); disagree (D); strongly disagree (SD); or don’t
know (DK), If you wish to make any further comments,
please do so.
Interview Schedule
1. The Congressman is greatly SA [ A 1 D SD DK
supported by his constituency
even though every case opened 3
in the district office has
not been resolved.
2. Most of Congressman Ford’s
constituents do not depend 3
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